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When a population is engaged in successive prisoner’s dilemmas, indirect reciprocity through reputation fosters
cooperation through the emergence of moral and action rules. A simplifie model has recently been proposed
where individuals choose between helping others or not and are judged good or bad for it by the rest of the
population. The reputation so acquired will condition future actions. In this model, eight strategies (referred
to as “leading eight”) enforce a high level of cooperation, generate high payoffs, and are therefore resistant to
invasions by other strategies. Here we show that, by assigning each individual one of two labels that peers can
distinguish (e.g., political ideas, religion, and skin color) and allowing moral and action rules to depend on the
label, intolerant behaviors can emerge within minorities under sufficien economic stress. We analyze the sets of
conditions where this can happen and also discuss the circumstances under which tolerance can be restored. Our
results agree with empirical observations that correlate intolerance and economic stress and predict a correlation
between the degree of tolerance of a population and its composition and ethical stance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Different kinds of discriminatory behavior based on mem-
bership to different groups—identified for example, by visible
tags [1]—has been reported both in human [2–5] and in animal
societies [6–10]. They can be broadly classifie into two main
types: in-group favoritism and out-group hostility [11–13].
Recent studies of in-group and out-group cooperation show
that in-group favoritism can emerge in the framework of
indirect reciprocity [14–16].
The concept of indirect reciprocity [17,18] has been
introduced to explain the emergence of cooperation in society,
where many interactions between the same individuals have
low chances to be repeated. Contrary to direct reciprocity [19],
indirect reciprocity implies that individuals receive the conse-
quences of their actions not directly from their opponents but
indirectly through society. Indirect reciprocity—and its related
reputation concept—has proven to be an important mechanism
for the emergence and sustainment of cooperation in small-
scale human [20–24] and nonhuman [25] societies. It also
plays an important role in communication networks [26,27].
In these reputation-based models, individuals have an opinion
about every interaction they witness and assign a reputation to
the individuals involved accordingly [21,28–31]. The nature
of their future interactions with those individuals will be
determined by the reputation they have assigned to them.
In a stylized model of indirect reciprocity Ohtsuki and
Iwasa [29] and Brandt and Sigmund [30] classifie the
strategies involved in these games attending to action and
assessment modules. The action module prescribes what to
do—whether to cooperate or not—given the reputations of
the individuals involved. The assessment module assigns
reputation to the interacting individuals according to a moral
code. To do it, three elements can be judged: the nature of the
*Present address: Artificia Intelligence Lab, Vrije Universiteit
Brussel, Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussels, Belgium.
interaction, the reputation of the recipient, and the reputation of
the donor. Strategies are thus classifie as first second, or third
order depending on whether the first the firs and the second,
or all the three elements are taken into account to assign a
reputation to the donor. Ohtsuki and Iwasa [29] studied the
evolutionarily stability of third-order strategieswhich share the
same moral assessment module, and later Martinez-Vaquero
and Cuesta [32] extended the study confronting strategies
with different moral codes. Among the evolutionary stable
strategies (ESS) found, there are eight strategies—the so-called
leading eight—that are considerably more efficien (get very
high payoff) and coherent (in terms of consistency between
their moral and actionmodules) than the rest of them. All these
strategies foster cooperation through indirect reciprocity.
This simple model of indirect reciprocity can be readily
extended to study the emergence of discriminatory behaviors
by introducing different groups of individuals identifie by
external signs (these may include physical or cultural traits).
Our goal in this work is to analyze under which conditions an
intolerant strategy (understood as out-group hostility) can in-
vade a tolerant population that follows one of the leading-eight
strategies. Whenever intolerance spreads, we are also inter-
ested in whether tolerance can be restored by introducing some
kind of external incentives. Our hope is that this study sheds
some light into the causes for the emergence of intolerance in
societies and the mechanisms to alleviate this social burden.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II we introduce
the model, which is mathematically implemented in Sec. III.
Our results are shown in Sec. IV and discussed in Sec. V.
II. MODEL
Our model is an extension of that used in a previous
work [32]—itself a modificatio of the indirect reciprocity
model based on reputation introduced by Brandt and Sig-
mund [30] and later investigated byOhtsuki and Iwasa [29,33].
We consider an infinite well-mixed population, where
every individual is aware of every action performed and
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produces a moral judgment—which leads to a reputation
assignment—on it. Each time step a pair of individuals is
randomly drawn—with equal probability—from the popula-
tion. One of them plays as the donor and the other one as the
recipient. The donor can decide to pay a cost c > 0 to help (C)
the recipient or not (D). Any helped recipient gains a payoff
b > c; otherwise there is no payoff whatsoever.
This action is observed by every individual in the pop-
ulation (including themselves). Thus everyone makes a pri-
vate judgment of the donor for this action. The observer’s
moral assessment will decide the reputation—good (G) or
bad (B)—she assigns to the donor. Accordingly, everybody
has a private opinion of every other individual—even of
herself.
By repeating this process the population eventually reaches
a steady state. The average payoff of this repeated game
is then computed for every individual. By assuming a very
large population we effectively neglect direct reciprocity—the
probability that two individuals meet again is very small.
Strategies are define by two modules: the action rules,
which tell the donor how to interact with the recipient, and
the moral rules, which prescribe a reputation for the donor of
every witnessed action. As in our previous paper [32], we will
consider third-order strategies.
The action rules determine what the donor must do (either
help or refuse to help) given the reputation of both players.
Specificall , aαβ = 1 (C) if a strategist with reputation α helps
an individual with reputation β and 0 (D) otherwise.
The moral assessments tell the individual if the action
just witnessed should be judged good or bad, hence revising
the donor’s reputation. Specificall , mαβ(a) = 1 (G) if the
observer assigns good reputation to a donor she previously
judged α, who performs an action a on a recipient she
previously judged β, and is 0 (B) otherwise.
Thus each strategy is define by 12 numbers: 4 for the
action module and 8 for the moral module. This amounts to
4096 different strategies in total.
Besides,wewill assume that players sometimesmake errors
when trying to help another individual [29,34–37]. Thus, with
a probability  a donor defects regardless of her action rules and
with 1 −  she performs the action she planned to.One possible
source of this error—which will be important in interpreting
the results of this work—is scarcity of resources. Despite her
willingness to help, an individual may fail to do it because
she cannot afford the cost c. Errors due to misjudgements are
excluded (see Ref. [32] for a justification)
Discrimination requires at least two different subpopula-
tions that can be clearly identifie by everybody. Thus we
divide our population into two classes, A and B. The fraction
of A individuals will be denoted y. A tolerant player will act
disregarding the individuals’ class when deciding her action
or judgment. An intolerant individual acts and judges like a
tolerant one with the following exceptions:
(1) Individuals of the other class are never helped.
(2) Donors of the other class are judged bad under any
circumstance.
(3) Individuals of her own class who do not help individu-
als of the other class are always judged good.
(4) Individuals of her own class who do help individuals
of the other class are always judged bad.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
Our goal is to determine, with the assumptions of the
model, under which conditions a small population of intolerant
(tolerant) mutantsM can invade a tolerant (intolerant) resident
population R made of A-type and B-type individuals in
fractions y and 1 − y, respectively. This fraction y will be
kept constant and is therefore a parameter of the model. We
will only consider scenarios where all individuals of the same
class in R show the same kind of behavior—either tolerant
or intolerant—toward the other class. Likewise, we will limit
ourselves to determine when the resident population can resist
the invasion of mutants. Determining the fina composition
of the population if the invasion succeeds is a more complex
problem that we will tackle in this paper.
Without loss of generality, in the following calculations
mutantswill be assumed to belong to classA. Likewise,wewill
only need to consider whether A-residents imitate the mutant.
If a B-resident imitates the A-mutant (its tolerant or intolerant
character) this can be treated as an invasion of B-residents
by a B-mutant separately—the reason being that mutants are
present in so small a fraction that the probability that two
mutants interact is negligible.
Accordingly, the different invasion scenarios will be de-
noted tM |tAtB, where tX can be either T (tolerant individuals)
or I (intolerant individuals), M denotes A-type mutants, and
A and B the two subpopulations. The four possible scenarios
are as follows:
I |T T : intolerant A-mutants try to invade a tolerant population;
T |IT : tolerant A-mutants try to invade a population made of
intolerant A-residents and tolerant B-residents;
I | T I : intolerant A-mutants try to invade a population made
of tolerant A-residents and intolerant B-residents;
T | II : tolerant A-mutants try to invade an intolerant
population.
The condition for A-residents to resist the invasion of A-
mutants isW (A|R) > W (M|R), whereW (A|R) andW (M|R)
are the average payoffs received by A-type residents and by
mutants, respectively. They can be obtained as
W (A|R) = b R,A − c A,R,
W (M|R) = b R,M − c M,R,
R,A = y θA,A + (1 − y) θB,A,
A,R = y θA,A + (1 − y) θA,B,
R,M = y θA,M + (1 − y) θB,M,
M,R = y θM,A + (1 − y) θM,B,
(1)
where θi,j is the probability that an i-strategist helps a j -
strategist. If i-strategists are intolerant and j -strategists belong
to a different class θi,j = 0; otherwise these probabilities can
be obtained as
θi,j = (1 − )
∑
αβ
χα
(
gii
)
χβ
(
gij
)
aαβ, (2)
where gji is the fraction of i-strategists that are considered
good by the j -strategists. We have introduced the auxiliary
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function
χγ (x) = γ x + (1 − γ )(1 − x). (3)
Thus if x represent the fraction of good individuals, then
χ1(x) = x and χ0(x) = 1 − x are the fraction of “good” and
“bad” individuals, respectively.
In order to calculate the fractions gji we firs need to
compute the fractions x	A	B	Mi of i-individuals with reputa-
tions 	A, 	B , and 	M according to A-residents, B-residents,
and mutants, respectively. Here 	i can be G (for good
reputation), B (for bad reputation), or * (for any reputation, G
or B). For instance, xG∗Bi represents the fraction of i-type
individuals who are considered good by A-residents and
bad by mutants, regardless of B-residents’ opinion. Hence
xG∗Bi =
∑
	B
x
G	BB
i . Thus
gAi = xG∗∗i , gBi = x∗G∗i , gMi = x∗∗Gi . (4)
It turns out that not all x	A	B	Mi are necessary to compute
g
j
i (see the Appendix for details). In general, all we need is to
obtain x	A∗	MA and x
	A∗	M
M and for some scenarios also x
	A∗	M
B
or x∗	B	MB . Since we are considering an infinit population,
self-interactions are negligible. Under the assumption that the
rate of mutants is very low, donors will only interact with
residents and therefore the dynamics of these fractions will be
given by
dx
	A∗	M
A
dt
= y T 	A	MA,A + (1 − y) F	A	MA,B − x	A∗	MA , (5)
dx
	A	B∗
B
dt
= (1 − y) T 	A	BB,B + y F	A	BB,A − x	A∗	BB , (6)
dx
∗	B	M
B
dt
= (1 − y) T 	B	MB,B + y F	B	MB,A − x∗	B	MB , (7)
dx
	A∗	M
M
dt
= y T 	A	MM,A + (1 − y) F	A	MM,B − x	A∗	MM , (8)
where the interactions with recipients of the same and of
the opposite class have been split into T 	l	mi,j and F
	l	m
i,j ,
respectively. Fractions F	l	mi,j depend on the scenario we are
considering, whereas T 	l	mi,j are common for all of them and
can be obtained as
T
	A	M
i,A =
∑
αAαMβAβM
x
αA∗αM
i x
βA∗βM
A
× R	A	M (αAβA,αMβM |αiβi), (9)
T
	A	B
B,B =
∑
αAαBβAβB
x
αAαB∗
B x
βAβB∗
B
× R	A	B (αAβA,αBβB |αBβB), (10)
T
	B	M
B,B =
∑
αBαMβBβM
x
∗αBαB
B x
∗βBβM
B
× R	B	M (αBβB,αMβM |αBβB), (11)
where R	l	m(αlβl,αmβm|αiβi) is the probability that an i-
type donor with reputation (αl,αm) acting on a recipient
with reputation (βl,βm), is assigned a reputation (	l,	m).
Reputations are as given by l-individuals and m-individuals,
respectively. This probability is obtained as
R	l	m (αlβl,αmβm|αiβi)
= (1 − ) δ(	l,mαlβl
(
aαiβi
))
δ
(
	m,mαmβm
(
aαiβi
))
+  δ(	l,mαlβl (D)
)
δ
(
	m,mαmβm (D)
)
. (12)
In general, Eqs. (5)–(8) need to be solved numerically.
Nevertheless, for the different scenarios that we will consider,
some simplification can be made. The details are reserved for
the Appendix.
IV. RESULTS
We focus our analysis on the leading-eight strategies
introduced by Ohtsuki and Iwasa [29]. In a previous paper [32]
we proved that, for reasonable values of benefit-to-cos and
error rates, these eight strategies are evolutionarily stable
against the invasion of any other strategy. On the other hand,
Ohtsuki and Iwasa [29] classifie the leading eight in three
groups (Table I), according to their stability against invasions
by fully defective action rules (AllD). Neglecting errors in the
moral assessment, Groups I and II can be invaded by AllD
TABLE I. Leading-eight strategies. The firs eight columns describe the moral assessment; the last four, the action rules. Strategies are
classifie into three groups (I, II, and III; see text).
mGG(C) mGG(D) mGB (C) mGB (D) mBG(C) mBG(D) mBB (C) mBB (D) aGG aGB aBG aBB
Ia G B G G G B G B C D C C
Ib G B B G G B G B C D C C
IIa G B G G G B G G C D C D
IIb G B G G G B B G C D C D
IIc G B B G G B G G C D C D
IId G B B G G B B G C D C D
IIIa G B G G G B B B C D C D
IIIb G B B G G B B B C D C D
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Values for  and y indicating the different regions where invasions I |T T , T |IT , and IT |I are successful for strategy
Ia. Above the horizontal line, AllD also can invade a tolerant population.
provided
b
c
< 1 +  + 2 + · · · = 1
1 −  , (13)
in other words, if the error in the action  > (b − c)/b.
Invading Group III requires b < c, though.
Therefore, for a given b > c, if  is sufficientl large, any
Group I or Group II strategy can be invaded by defectors,
whereas Group III strategies always resist invasions. As we
will show below, these are the same conditions under which
intolerance can spread, but intolerant strategies obtain a higher
payoff than AllD because they are indistinguishable from the
strategy used by residents of their same group. Accordingly,
when two distinguishable groups coexist in a population,
intolerant strategies are preferred over AllD.
In what follows we will consider the different invasion
scenarios for which there exists a parameter region where
invasion occurs. These regions are determined numerically
and represented in Figs. 1–8 as colored areas in a –y
plane, where y represents the fraction of A-residents in the
community. For the sake of clarity of the representations,
we will sometimes assume that the invader is of type A, and
sometimes of type B. Consistent with the previous section, we
will denote tM |tAtB—tX = T ,I being the tolerant/intolerant
character of type X individuals—whenever the mutant is
of type A, and tAtB |tM whenever the mutant is of type B.
(Notice, however, that y will always represent the fraction of
A-residents, which will coincide with the type of mutants in
the former case but not in the latter.) Changing the type of
mutant will make analyzing successive invasions I |T T and
IT |I—which would turn a fully tolerant population into a
fully intolerant one—much easier.
In all invasion scenarios that we will consider, we will
just determine the stability of the resident population against
invasion by mutants, but not the fina equilibrium (hence we
do not determine whether there is a turnover of the invaded
population or a fina coexistence is reached). Figures 1–6
correspond to Group I and Group II strategies, whereas Figs. 7
and 8 correspond to Group III strategies.
The different scenarios are as follows: I |T T , T |IT , IT |I ,
and T |II . Overlaps of these regions are colored by a mixed
color.
First, Figures 1–6 show that tolerant communities that
follow Group I and Group II strategies can be invaded by
intolerant individuals (I |T T ) if  is sufficientl high and/or
b/c sufficientl low. Minorities are more prone to undergo
such a spread of intolerance. Second, if one of the two resident
types is intolerant and the other one is tolerant, intolerant
residents can be invaded by tolerant mutants (T |IT ) provided
they are aminority (in all cases thatwe have analyzed y < 0.5).
However, this T |IT region never overlaps with the I |T T one,
so after a spread of intolerance the “economic conditions”
must change for tolerance to be restored. Third, if in a
community with tolerant and intolerant residents the latter
are the majority, then this strategy can spread also among the
tolerant residents (IT |I ), thus dividing the community into
two separate groups that dislike and never help each other.
And, finall , a fully intolerant community resists invasion
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Same as Fig. 1 but for strategy Ib.
FIG. 3. (Color online) Same as Fig. 1 but for strategy IIa.
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Same as Fig. 1 but for strategy IIb.
FIG. 5. (Color online) Same as Fig. 1 but for strategy IIc.
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Same as Fig. 1 but for strategy IId.
FIG. 7. (Color online) Same as Fig. 1 but for strategy IIIa, with the new invasion scenario II |T .
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FIG. 8. (Color online) Same as Fig. 7 but for strategy IIIb.
by tolerant individuals for any combination of parameters.
Hence, there is no way to restore tolerance in a fully intolerant
community by tuning the parameters of the model (but see
Sec. IVA).
If we associate low b/c ratios and high  with strait
conditions, the interpretation emerging from these results is
that economic stress favors the spread of intolerance within
minorities. Once it has invaded a group, tolerance cannot
be restored unless the economic conditions improve. And if
intolerance has eventually split the community, not even that
can restore tolerance again.
Group III strategies differ substantially (Figs. 7 and 8). A
tolerant population following any of these strategies always
resists the invasions of intolerant mutants regardless of
the parameter setting (i.e., invasion I |T T never happens).
Furthermore, if one type is tolerant and the other one intolerant
in the resident population, tolerant mutants can invade the
intolerant residents (T |IT ). Intolerant mutants can also invade
the tolerant residents (IT |I ), but this occurs in a much
narrower region of the diagram compared to what happens
for Group I and Group II strategies. As a matter of fact,
intolerant mutants only succeed if they try to invade a minority
of tolerant residents when the rest of the community is
intolerant. Furthermore, if we start from a society where
both subpopulations are intolerant, tolerant mutants have
a chance to invade the minority and spread their strategy
(II |T )—and perhaps eventually turn the community into
tolerant individuals in the brown region, the overlap between
II |T and T |IT invasion regions. Overall, Group III strategies
prove more stable against intolerance.
A. Incentives to restore tolerance
As shown in the previous section, if a tolerant community—
or one of the two subpopulations within it—following a Group
I or a Group II strategy eventually becomes intolerant, there
is no way to restore tolerance again by spreading it among
the intolerant individuals. The only way to achieve this is
by “improving the economic conditions” (i.e., decreasing 
and/or increasing b/c). An alternative way to generate the
same effect could be to introduce an exogenous incentive.
We have implemented one such policy through a reduction
of the cost of helping others. In other words, we assume
the presence of a superagent who partly subsidizes the cost
of helping individuals of a subpopulation. This is done by
lowering the cost of helping B-strategists. By assuming this
cost c′ < c, Eqs. (1) turn into
W ′(A|R) = b R,A − ′A,R,
W ′(M|R) = b R,M − ′M,R,
(14)
where
′A,R = c θA,A + c′ θA,B,
′M,R = c θM,A + c′ θM,B.
(15)
The new scenarios where individuals of a class are given
incentives to help the other class are I |T ′T , T ′|IT , I |T ′I ,
and T ′|II , where primes mark individuals who pay the
lower cost c′ for helping the opposite class. Equations (14)
must be used for these individuals, whereas nonprimed
individuals follow Eqs. (1), as usual. Intolerant individuals are
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FIG. 9. (Color online) Conditions of  and y under which the invasions T ′|II , I |T ′I , and T ′I |T are successful for Ib (left) and IId (right)
strategies. Incentivated cost c′ = 0.
never marked since they never never help the opposite class
anyway.
From now on we focus only in Groups I and Group II
strategies because tolerant populations following Group III
strategies are intolerance-proof. The most effective incentive
is reached for c′ = 0 (i.e., helping the opposite class is free).
Since strategies belonging to the same group have a very
similar behavior, we show only one example for each group in
Figs. 9 and 10.
Starting from a fully intolerant population, we represent in
Fig. 9 the regionwhere incentives are able to promote tolerance
in one of the subpopulation (T ′|II ). Wherever this invasion
succeeds, the situation cannot be reverted, i.e., invasions I |T ′I
never occur for the same parameter values (I |T ′I and regions
T ′|II do not overlap). But, on the other hand, intolerant
residents in a T ′I population cannot be invaded by tolerant
mutants (T ′I |T ) for the same parameter values (again, T ′I |T
and T ′|II regions do not overlap). In other words, if incentives
promote tolerance in one subpopulation of fully intolerant
individuals, the other subpopulation will still resist invasions
by tolerant mutants. Incentives are thus not enough to make a
fully tolerant community.
On the other hand, Fig. 10 shows that the region of T ′I |T ′
invasions does overlap with the region of T ′|II invasions.
Thus, by providing incentives to both A and B groups, there
are chances to transform a fully intolerant community into a
fully tolerant one. The latter is also stable because the region
where T ′T ′|I invasions succeed does not overlap with the
T ′I |T ′ region.
Figure 10 also shows that if an II community has been
formed through a sequence of invasions T T → IT → II
from an original T T community, the values of  and y where
this happens are compatible with those for which full tolerance
might be restored through (extreme, i.e., c′ = 0) incentives.
The extreme case c′ = 0 is not very realistic, so in general one
will have 0 < c′ < c, and the overlap regions are presumably
smaller. But worse than that is the fact that, as soon as
incentives are removed, the scenarios of Figs. 1–6 are restored
and intolerance takes over again. So the effect of incentives is
not permanent.
V. DISCUSSION
We have studied under which conditions intolerance can
invade a tolerant community made of two distinguishable
subgroups. Our results show differences between two sets
of the stable and coherent strategies known in the literature
of indirect reciprocity as leading-eight strategies. In the
firs set (Groups I and II) intolerance can invade a tolerant
subpopulation if the action error (which might associate to
lack of resources) is high enough and/or the benefit-to-cos
ratio is low. This invasion is more likely to occur if the invaded
subpopulation is aminority. Once one of the two subpopulation
becomes intolerant, there is no way to restore tolerance under
FIG. 10. (Color online) Conditions of  and y under which the invasions T ′|II , T ′I |T ′, and T ′T ′|I are successful for Ib (left) and IId
(right) strategies. Dark (light) line shows the limit of the I |T T (IT |T ) region. Incentivated cost c′ = 0.
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the same economic conditions. Moreover, if the intolerant
minority is large enough, intolerance can also invade the
tolerant minority. A completely intolerant population cannot
return to tolerance even if economic conditions improve.
If one subpopulation is provided incentives to help the other,
tolerance can be restored for a limited region of parameters,
but the other subpopulation does not turn to tolerance by
invasion. To transform a fully intolerant community into a
fully tolerant one both subpopulations must be stimulated
to help the other. Nonetheless, as soon as these incentives
are removed, intolerance can invade again. Thus, incentives
have no permanent effect unless the economic conditions are
simultaneously improved. Incentives may provide a temporary
mean to achieve the goal, but improving the economic
conditions is key to make the effect perdurable.
In the second set of strategies (Group III), a fully tolerant
population is intolerance-proof. As a matter of fact, if we
start off from a fully intolerant community, tolerant mutants
can invade it much easier than for the firs set of strategies
(Groups I and II). The difference between the second set and
the firs set—hence the reason why they resist intolerance—is
that the only way for an individual with bad reputation to
achieve a good reputation is if he helps another individual
with good reputation. In other words, these strategies are less
prone to forgive.
A way to interpret errors in actions is as a measure of global
poverty of the society. If resources are scarce, it may happen
that an individual is forced to deny help that would otherwise
provide. But there may exist alternative interpretations, e.g., it
can also stand as the probability that an individual is discovered
when she secretly tries to cheat (defect). In this case, the results
suggest that intolerance spreads easier in a society with a high
proportion of known fraud. Note that in our model players do
not know the reasons that may drive someone to defect, i.e.,
they do not know if a player defects on purpose or because
she lacks the resources for it. The knowledge of these inner
motivations would involve much higher cognitive processes
than the simple direct observation that we are considering here.
In contrast to Nakamura and Masuda [15], we did not need
to make anymean-fiel approximation since reputations in our
model come directly from the observation of every interaction.
The model we introduced is a simplifie description of very
complex behaviors in the real world. In particular, our model
considers that the whole society can be split into two classes
whose differentiation is based only on one set of traits. How-
ever many different sets of traits can differentiate individuals
in real life, and different people may classify individuals
according to different criteria. Even the relative importance
of some of these traits may change in time [38]. In complex
scenarios with more classes of individuals and different ways
to classify them the results will presumably differ.
The study we have conducted has further limitations. Apart
from the obvious fact that using an indirect reciprocity model
with binary reputation and complete information certainly
oversimplifie the problem (see Refs. [39] and [32] for a
discussion of these issues), the main one is that we have
considered only the onset of invasion by a small fraction of
mutants but not the existence or absence ofmixed equilibria (as
can be done, e.g., in direct reciprocity models [40]). In other
words, this study does not address the more difficul question
whether there is a turnover of the population or a coexistence of
strategies. And definitel simultaneous invasions by different
type of mutants are excluded. There is the implicit assumption
that mutants emerge at a rate slower than the time needed to
reach an equilibrium. The existence of mixed equilibria thus
remains an open problem.
These limitations notwithstanding, our study provides
some simple clues that associate the emergence of intolerant
attitudes with economic stress and the relative weight of the
subgroups. Remarkably, given the simplicity of the model,
economic stress is recognized as one of the main predictors
for the emergence of intolerance [41]. As a matter of fact,
this is a typical prediction of social “scapegoat” theories [42],
examples of which are the research on the increased lynching
of American blacks during times of economic distress [43,44]
and the rise of fascism and anti-Semitism in Germany during
the interwar years [45,46]. Our study also makes some
predictions that are amenable to be tested in real situations,
like the fact that intolerance emerges predominantly within
minorities, or—perhaps more importantly—that societies with
a stricter ethics are more resistant to intolerance than those
indulging a relaxed attitude towards defective behavior of their
members. We hope that this work stimulates empirical studies
in these directions.
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APPENDIX A: HOMOGENEOUS POPULATIONS
It will prove useful to introduce the auxiliary function
U (x1,x2) =
∑
αβ
χα(x1)χβ(x2)Pαβ, (A1)
with χα(x) as define by (3) and
Pαβ = (1 − )mαβ(aαβ) + mαβ(D) (A2)
the probability that a donor with reputation α performing the
action aαβ on a recipient with reputation β is considered good
according to the moral rule mαβ(a).
In a homogeneous population—where all its members
belong to same type—the dynamics of the fraction of good
individuals g follows the differential equation
dg
dt
= U (g,g) − g. (A3)
In equilibrium g = U (g,g), a quadratic equation with a unique
stable solution 0 ≤ g ≤ 1 [32].
For later convenience, we will consider a continuous
perturbation of the above equation, namely
x = aU (x,x) + 1 − a, (A4)
and denote x = p(a) its stable solution in the interval [0,1].
Clearly p(1) = g, the solution of the unperturbed equation.
Another function that we will use later is the solution of
the linear equation x = aU (x,k) + 1 − a, 0 ≤ a,k ≤ 1, which
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can be readily obtained as
x = 1 + a [kP01 + (1 − k)P00 − 1]
1 − a [kP11 − (1 − k)P10 + kP01 + (1 − k)P00]
≡ p˜(k,a).
(A5)
APPENDIX B: EQUILIBRIA FOR THE
DIFFERENT SCENARIOS
We must obtain the equilibrium solutions of Eqs. (5)–(8)
in order to compute the probabilities θi,j , which depend on
x
	A	B	M
i . The set of Eqs. (8) is decoupled from Eqs. (5)–(7),
hence x	A∗	MM can be calculated analytically from Eq. (8) after
solving Eqs. (5)–(7). Thus one can readily obtain gMM and
reduce Eq. (8) to a linear system of two equations in two
unknowns (for example, xG∗GM and x
B∗B
M ). In what follows, we
describe the processes to complete our calculations for each
different scenario.
1. I|TT scenario
This case considers the possible invasion of a fully
tolerant resident population by a small fraction of intolerant
mutants. Since residents do not distinguish classes, the resident
population acts as a homogeneous population. Therefore
x
∗	B	M
i = x	A∗	Mi , θB,A = θA,B = θA,A, θB,M = θA,M , and
θM,B = 0. The fraction of good residents is gAB = xAA = p(1),
as previously discussed. According to the definitio of gAA ,
Eq. (4), we have
xG∗BA = gAA − xG∗GA , (B1)
xB∗GA = 1 − gAA − xB∗BA . (B2)
Then, the fraction F	A	MA,B introduced in Eq. (5) can be
expressed in this scenario as
F
	A	M
A,B =
∑
αβ
χα
(
gAA
)
χβ
(
gAA
)
P
	A	M
A (αβ), (B3)
P
	A	M
A (αβ) = (1 − ) δ(	A,mαβ(aαβ))
× δ(	M,1 − aαβ )
+  δ(	A,mαβ(D))× δ(	M,1).
(B4)
Once we numerically solve the two Eqs. (5), Eq. (8),
which corresponds to the intolerant mutants, can be solved
analytically by taking into account that
F
	A	M
M,B =
∑
αβ
χα
(
gAM
)
χβ
(
gAB
)
P
	A	M
M (αβ), (B5)
P
	A	M
M (αβ) = δ(	A,mαβ(D))δ(	M,1). (B6)
If at equilibrium Eq. (8) is summed over 	A, we fin that gMM
is given by p˜(gMA ,y). Then the set of Eqs. (8) simplifie to just
two equations.
2. T |IT scenario
In this scenario a small fraction of tolerant individuals tries
to invade a population where individuals of their own class
are intolerant (θA,B = 0), whereas those of the other class are
tolerant. Since mutants and B-residents are both tolerant, they
will judge every player equally. Then x	A	B∗i = x	A∗	Mi .
The dynamics of the intolerant A-strategists is described by
Eq. (5), where
F
	A	M
A,B =
∑
αβ
χα
(
gMA
)
χβ
(
gMB
)
P
	A	M
A (αβ), (B7)
P
	A	M
A (αβ) = δ(	M,mαβ(D))δ(	A,1). (B8)
Summing Eqs. (5) over 	M at equilibrium we obtain gAA =
p(y). In this scenario we also need to calculate gMB . Since
B-mutant’s judgments are the same as those of B-residents,
gMB is given at equilibrium by
gMB = (1 − y)U
(
gMB ,g
M
B
)+ yU(gMB ,gAM
)
. (B9)
Therefore, we need to solve a system of three equations
[two from Eqs. (5) plus Eq. (B9)], choosing, for instance,
xG∗GA , x
B∗B
A , and g
M
B as unknowns. After solving this system
numerically, the set of Eqs. (8), where
F
	A	M
M,B =
∑
αβ
χα
(
gMM
)
χβ
(
gBM
)
P
	A	M
M (αβ), (B10)
P
	A	M
M (αβ) = (1 − ) δ(	M,mαβ(aαβ))
× δ(	A,1− aαβ)
+  δ(	M,mαβ(D))× δ(	A,1),
(B11)
can be solved analytically. For that we take into account that
summing over 	A at equilibrium yields gMM = p˜(ygMA + (1 −
y)gMB ,1).
3. I|T I scenario
In this scenario a small fraction of intolerant mutants tries
to invade a population where individuals of their own class are
tolerant, whereas those of the other class are intolerant. Hence
θB,A = θB,M = θM,B = 0.
In order to calculate gAB we firs need to compute x
	A	B∗
B
through Eq. (6), where
F
	A	B
B,A =
∑
αβ
χα
(
gAB
)
χβ
(
gAA
)
P
	A	B
B (αβ), (B12)
P
	A	B
B (αβ) = δ(	A,mαβ(D))δ(	B,1), (B13)
and summing over 	A at equilibrium one obtains that gBB =
p(1 − y). This way, we reduce the set of Eqs. (6) to just two
equations.
Now, the dynamics of the tolerant individuals is given by
Eq. (5), with
F
	A	M
A,B =
∑
αβ
χα
(
gAA
)
χβ
(
gAB
)
P
	A	M
A (αβ), (B14)
P
	A	M
A (αβ) = (1 − ) δ(	A,mαβ(aαβ))
× δ(	M,1 − aαβ )
+  δ(	A,mαβ(D))× δ(	M,1).
(B15)
The only simplificatio that works in this case is to take
into account that xB∗GA = 1 − xG∗GA − xG∗BA − xB∗BA . Thus we
need to solve numerically fi e coupled equations: three from
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Eqs. (5) and two from Eqs. (6), corresponding to the unknowns
xGG∗B , x
BB∗
B , x
G∗G
A , x
G∗B
B , and x
B∗B
B .
The dynamics of the mutants is solved from Eq. (8), where
F
	A	M
M,B =
∑
αβ
χα
(
gAM
)
χβ
(
gAB
)
P
	A	M
M (αβ), (B16)
P
	A	M
M (αβ) = δ(	A,mαβ(D)) δ(	M,1). (B17)
Summing over 	A at equilibrium yields gMM = p˜(gMA ,y) and
transforms the last equation to just two linear equations.
4. T |I I scenario
In this last scenario a small fraction of tolerant mutants
tries to invade a completely intolerant population. Then θA,B =
θB,A = θB,M = 0.
The dynamics for the intolerant A-residents is described by
Eq. (5) with
F
	A	M
A,B =
∑
αβ
χα
(
gMA
)
χβ
(
gMB
)
P
	A	M
A (αβ), (B18)
P
	A	M
A (αβ) = δ(	M,mαβ(D))δ(	A,1). (B19)
Summing over 	M at equilibrium yields gAA = p(y).
In order to calculate gMB , we need firs to compute x
∗	B	M
B .
The dynamics for these fractions is described by Eq. (7),
where
F
	B	M
B,A =
∑
αβ
χα
(
gMB
)
χβ
(
gMA
)
P
	B	M
B (αβ), (B20)
P
	B	M
B (αβ) = δ(	M,mαβ(D))δ(	B,1), (B21)
and, summing again over 	M , we obtain that gBB = p(1 − y).
Thus we have four coupled equations [two from Eqs. (6) and
two from Eq. (7)] for the unknowns xG∗GA , x
B∗B
A , x
∗GG
B , and
x∗BBB , which need to be solved numerically.
On the other hand, the dynamics of the tolerant mutants is
given by Eq. (7), where
F
	A	M
M,B =
∑
αβ
χα
(
gMM
)
χβ
(
gMB
)
P
	A	M
M (αβ), (B22)
P
	A	M
M (αβ) = (1 − ) δ(	M,mαβ(aαβ))
× δ(	A,1 − aαβ)
+  δ(	M,mαβ(D))δ(	A,1).
(B23)
This set of equations can be reduced to just two because
summing over 	A at equilibrium yields gMM = p˜(ygMA + (1 −
y)gMB ,1).
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